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CYBER OPERATIONS AND THE JUS AD BELLUM REVISITED
MICHAEL N. ScHMIrr*
O VER a decade ago, Professor John Murphy and I presented papers ata U.S. Naval War College conference on Computer Network Attack
and International Law.' At the time, I was an Air Force officer assigned to
the College and he an eminent scholar at Villanova University School of
Law. Professor Murphy generously and graciously took me under his wing
and has been a cherished mentor ever since. It was a particular pleasure
to serve as the Naval War College's 2007-2008 Charles H. Stockton Profes-
sor, a post which Professor Murphy held with great distinction in 1980-
1981. Over the years, it has also been my good fortune to become close
friends with him. Therefore, it is a tremendous honor for me to contrib-
ute to this effort to mark Professor Murphy's long and distinguished ser-
vice to our nation, the international law community, and Villanova
University. I do so by revisiting the topic that began our friendship: cyber
operations.
I. INTRODUCTION
In April and May 2007, Estonia was victimized by massive computer
network attacks.2 The incident began with rioting incited by ethnic Rus-
sian cyber agitators in response to the government's decision to move a
Soviet war memorial from the center of Tallinn to a military cemetery on
the outskirts of the capital. Subsequent actions included direct cyber at-
tacks against Estonian targets, including government and commercial In-
ternet infrastructure and information systems such as the those of the
President, Prime Minister, Parliament, State Audit Office, ministries, polit-
ical parties, banks, news agencies, and Internet service providers. They
involved denial of service (DoS), distributed denial of service (DDoS), de-
facement, and destruction.
* Chairman, International Law Department, US Naval War College. The
views expressed in this Article are those of the author in his personal capacity and
do not necessarily represent those of the US Navy or any other US government
entity. This Article benefitted from the generous support of the National Research
Council of the National Academies. It is based in part on Michael N. Schmitt,
Cyber Operations in International Law: The Use of Force, Collective Security, Self-Defense,
and Armed Conflicts, in DETERRING CYBERATACKS: INFORMING STRATEGIES AND
DEVELOPING OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 151 (2010), portions of which are
reproduced with permission.
1. The proceedings of the 1999 conference were published as 76 INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw STUDIES: COMPUTER NETWORK ArACK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Michael N. Schmitt & Brian O'Donnell eds., 2002).
2. For an excellent discussion of the attacks, see ENEKEN TIKK ET AL., INTERNA-
TIONAL CYBER INCIDENTS: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 14-33 (2010).
(569)
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Because Estonia had invested heavily in networking following inde-
pendence, the attacks proved devastating. By 2007, the country relied on
information services for everything from banking and filing tax returns to
paying for parking and public transportation. Internet services covered all
of Estonia, with half the population enjoying access from their homes.
Most of the attacks emanated from outside the country, principally
Russia. Their origin was also traced to at least 177 other countries.3 Ini-
tially, they came from private IP addresses, although experts tracked a
number to Russian government institutions. It remains uncertain whether
the latter were launched with the government's knowledge. As the cyber
attacks unfolded, they became increasingly sophisticated, evidencing con-
siderable organization and command and control. While various pro-Rus-
sian activist groups apparently executed some of the second-wave
operations, there is no firm evidence that the Russian government either
conducted or orchestrated them.
The impact of the cyber assault proved dramatic; government activi-
ties such as the provision of state benefits and the collection of taxes
ground to a halt, private and public communications were disrupted, and
confidence in the economy plummeted. But what was the legal character
of the incident?
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the international commu-
nity crafted a new normative scheme in the form of the United Nations
Charter, which includes both a prohibition on the use of force in interna-
tional relations and a system for enforcing the proscription. Today, the
Charter, together with related customary international law norms,4 gov-
erns how and when force may be employed by States.
This Article explores the contemporary international law governing
cyber operations. In particular, it asks three questions relevant to the
Charter scheme governing the use of force in international relations:
1) When does a cyber operation constitute a wrongful "use of
force" in violation of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Char-
ter and customary international law?;
2) When does a cyber operation amount to a "threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression," such that
the Security Council may authorize a response thereto?; and
3) When does a cyber operation constitute an "armed attack,"
such that the victim-state may defend itself, even kinetically,
pursuant to the right of self-defense set forth in Article 51 of
the UN Charter and customary international law?
3. See Charles Clover, Kremlin-Backed Group Behind Estonia Cyber Blitz, FIN.
TIMEs, Mar. 11, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/57536d5a-Oddc-11de-8ea3-000
0779fd2ac.html#axzzlDtPlzO27.
4. For a further discussion of customary international law, see infra note 13
and accompanying text.
570 [Vol. 56: p. 569
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The attacks against Estonia, similar ones against Georgia during its
armed conflict with Russia in 2008,5 and the thousands of others directed
against government, corporate, and private systems worldwide on a daily
basis aptly demonstrate the reality, immediacy, and scale of the threat. It
is one well-recognized by states. The May 2010 U.S. National Security
Strategy cites cyber security threats as "one of the most serious national
security, public safety, and economic challenges we face as a nation."6
Similarly, the analysis and recommendations on NATO's new Strategic
Concept prepared by a group of distinguished experts led by former U.S.
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright singled out "cyber assaults of varying
degrees of severity" as one of the three likeliest threats the NATO Allies
will face in the next decade.7
Unfortunately, the existing legal norms do not offer a clear and com-
prehensive framework within which states can shape policy responses to
the threat of hostile cyber operations. In particular, international law as
traditionally understood departs at times from what the international com-
munity would presumably demand in the cyber context. To some extent,
this divergence can be accommodated through reasonable interpretation
of the relevant norms. Where it cannot, the law would seem to require
attention, either through treaty action or through the development of new
understandings of the prevailing legal concepts.8
II. CYBER OPERATIONS AS A "USE OF FORCE"
The United Nations Charter, in Article 2(4), states that "[a]ll Mem-
bers [of the United Nations] shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations." Despite the reference to territorial in-
tegrity and political independence, it is now widely understood that the
prohibition applies to any use of force not otherwise permitted by the
terms of the Charter, specifically uses of force authorized by the Security
Council and defensive operations, each discussed separately below.9
5. See TiKK ET AL., supra note 2, at 66-90 (describing cyber attacks against
Georgia during dispute with Russia over South Ossetia).
6. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 27 (2010) [hereinafter
2010 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/rss viewer/national-security-strategy.pdf.
7. See N. Atlantic Treaty Org. [NATO], NATO 2020: Assured Secuity; Dynamic
Engagement 17 (May 17, 2010) [hereinafter NATO 2020], available at http://www.
nato.int/strategic-concept/expertsreport.pdf. The others are an attack by a ballis-
tic missile and strikes by international terrorist groups. See id. (listing most proba-
ble threats of coming decade).
8. For book length treatment of these issues, see INTERNATIONAL LAw STUDIES:
COMPUTER NETWORK A-rACK AND INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 1; THOMAS C.
WINGFIELD, THE LAW OF INFORMATION CONFLICT: NATIONAL SECURITY LAW IN CYBER-
SPACE (2000); 64 A.F. L. REV. (2009) (dedicating edition to cyberlaw).
9. In its original form, the draft Charter contained no reference to territorial
integrity or political independence, and their subsequent inclusion was controver-
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Article 2(4) was revolutionary in its extension to threats. Of course,
only those threats of a use of force that would otherwise be unlawful qual-
ify.1 0 For instance, threatening destructive defensive cyber attacks against
another state's military infrastructure if that state unlawfully mounts cross-
border operations would not breach the norm. However, threats of de-
structive cyber operations against another state's critical infrastructure un-
less that state cedes territory would do so.
The prohibition applies only to an explicit or implied communication
of a threat; its essence is coercive effect. It does not reach actions which
simply threaten the security of the target state, but which are not commu-
nicative in nature. Thus, the introduction into a state's cyber systems of
vulnerabilities that are capable of destructive activation at some later date
would not constitute a threat of the use of force unless their presence is
known to the target state and the originating state exploits them for some
coercive purpose."
It is generally accepted that the prohibition on the threat or use of
force represents customary international law.' 2 Resultantly, it binds all
states regardless of membership in the United Nations. Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court ofJustice (ICJ) defines customary law as
"general practice accepted as law." 3 It requires the coexistence of state
practice and opinio juris sive necessitatis, a belief that the practice is engaged
in, or refrained from, out of a sense of legal obligation (rather than practi-
cal or policy reasons).
Although simple in formulation, the norm is complex in substantive
composition. It poses two key questions: "What is a use of force?" and "To
whom does the prohibition apply?" Both bear heavily on the legality of
cyber operations, which did not exist when the UN Charter was adopted
by states in 1945. The difficulty of applying a legal provision that did not
contemplate a particular type of operation is apparent.
Finally, it must be borne in mind that neither Article 2(4) nor its
customary counterpart is remedial in nature. Rather, they merely set a
threshold for breach of international law. The nature of the response to a
sial. The "other manner" language was inserted to make clear that their inclusion
was not meant to limit the reach of the provision. See Doc. 1123, 1/8, 6 U.N.C.I.O.
Docs. 65 (1945); Doc. 885, I/1/34, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 387 (1945); Doc. 784, 1/
1/27, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 336 (1945).
10. This point was made by the International Court ofJustice in Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 1 47 (July 8)
("[I]f the use of force itself in a given case is illegal-for whatever reason-the
threat to use such force will likewise be illegal.").
11. Although a threat must be coercive in some sense, there is no require-
ment that a specific "demand" accompany the threat.
12. See Military and PARAMILITARY Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicara-
gua) (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 98-101 (June 27).
13. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, 1977 I.C.J. Acts &
Docs. 61. On customary law, see Yoram Dinstein, The Interaction Between Customary
International Law and Treaties, in 322 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY
OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 243 (2006).
572 [Vol. 56: p. 569
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wrongful use of force is instead determined by the law of state responsibil-
ity, the scope of authority of the Security Council, and the law of self-de-
fense. Each is addressed below.
A. Uses of Force
Do cyber operations constitute a "use of force" as that phrase is un-
derstood in relation to the prohibition? The interpretive dilemma is that
the drafters of the Charter took a cognitive shortcut by framing the treaty's
prohibition in terms of the instrument of coercion employed-force. Thus,
the norm did not outlaw economic and political coercion, but disallowed
military force, at least absent an express Charter exception. Yet, it is sel-
dom the instrument employed, but instead the consequences suffered, that
matter to states. At the time the Charter was drafted an instrument based-
approach made sense, for prior to the advent of cyber operations the con-
sequences that states sought to avoid usually comported with instrument-
based categories. Cyber operations do not fit neatly into this paradigm
because although they are "non-forceful" (that is, non-kinetic), their con-
sequences can range from mere annoyance to death. Resultantly, as the
Commander of U.S. Cyber Command noted during his confirmation hear-
ings, policy makers must understand that "[t] here is no international con-
sensus on a precise definition of a use of force, in or out of cyberspace.
Consequently, individual nations may assert different definitions, and may
apply different thresholds for what constitutes a use of force."' 4
That the term "use of force" encompasses resort to armed force by a
state, especially force levied by the military is self-evident. Armed force
thus includes kinetic force-dropping bombs, firing artillery, and so forth.
It would be no less absurd to suggest that cyber operations that generate
consequences analogous to those caused by kinetic force lie beyond the
prohibition's reach, than to exclude other destructive non-kinetic actions,
such as biological or radiological warfare. Accordingly, cyber operations
that directly result (or are likely to result) in physical harm to individuals
or tangible objects equate to armed force, and are therefore uses of force.
For instance, those targeting an air traffic control system or a water treat-
ment facility clearly endanger individuals and property. But cyber opera-
tions are usually mounted without causing such consequences, as
illustrated by the case of Estonia. Are such operations nonetheless barred
by the use-of-force prohibition?
The starting point for any interpretive endeavor in law is the treaty
text in question.' 5 In this regard, note that the adjective "armed" does not
14. Staff of S. Comm. on Armed Services, Advance Questions for Lieutenant
General Keith Alexander, USA, Nominee for Commander, United States Cyber
Command from the United States' Armed Services Committee (Apr. 15, 2010),
www.senate.gov/-armed-services/statemnt/2010/04%2OApril/Alexander%2004-15-10.pdf.
15. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "[a] treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
5
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appear with reference to "force" in Article 2(4). By contrast, the Charter
preamble cites the purpose of ensuring that "armed force shall not be
used, save in the common interest." Similarly, the Charter excludes
"armed force" from the non-forceful measures the Security Council may
authorize under Article 41 and mentions planning for armed force with
regard to forceful Article 42 measures.16 And the Charter only allows
forceful defensive actions in the face of an "armed attack."1 7 This textual
distinction suggests an interpretation of "force" that is broader in scope
than the common understanding of the term.
When text is ambiguous, recourse may be had to "the preparatory
work of [a] treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion."1 8 The Char-
ter's travaux preparatoires indicate that during the drafting of the instru-
ment a proposal to extend the reach of Article 2(4) to economic coercion
was decisively defeated.19 A quarter century later, the issue again arose
during proceedings leading to the UN General Assembly's Declaration on
Friendly Relations. 20 The question of whether "force" included "all forms
of pressure, including those of a political or economic character, which
have the effect of threatening the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any State" was answered in the negative. 2 1 Whatever force is,
then, it is not economic or political pressure. Therefore, a cyber opera-
tion that involves such coercion is definitely not a prohibited use of force.
Psychological cyber operations (assuming they are non-destructive) in-
tended solely to undermine confidence in a government or economy illus-
trate such actions.
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and pur-
pose" which can be gleaned from the text, "including its preamble and annexes
." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1)-(2), May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340 (emphasis added). The United States is not a party to the
Vienna Convention, but treats most of its provisions as reflective of customary in-
ternational law.
16. See U.N. Charter art. 46 (referencing planning for armed force). "Plans
for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the
assistance of the Military Staff Committee." Id.
17. U.N. Charter art. 51.
18. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 15, art. 32, 1155
U.N.T.S. at 340.
19. See Doc. 2, G/7(e) (4), 3 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 251, 253-54 (1945). Economic
coercion, which typically involves trade sanctions, must be distinguished from
"blockade," which has the effect of cutting off trade, but employs military force to
do so. It has historically been accepted that imposition of a blockade is an "act of
war."
20. See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970).
21. U.N. GAOR Special Comm. on Friendly Relations, U.N. Doc. A/AC.125/
SR.114 (1970); accord Rep. of the Special Comm. on Principles of Int'l Law Con-
cerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States, U.N. GAOR, 24th
Sess., Supp. No. 19, U.N. Doc. A/7619 (1969). The draft declaration contained
text tracking that of U.N. Charter Article 2(4).
574 [Vol. 56: p. 569
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Suggestions to limit "force" to "armed force," or even the force re-
quired to amount to an "armed attack," were likewise rejected during the
proceedings.2 2 This seemed to indicate that "force" was not coterminous
with "armed force," thereby strengthening the significance of the absence
of the term "armed" in Article 2(4). In the Case Concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua,2 3 the ICJ expressly charac-
terized certain actions that were non-kinetic in nature as uses of force:
[W]hile the arming and training of the contras can certainly be
said to involve the threat or use of force against Nicaragua, this is
not necessarily so in respect of all the assistance given by the
United States Government. In particular, the Court considers
that the mere supply of funds to the contras, while undoubtedly
an act of intervention in the internal affairs of Nicaragua .. .does
not in itself amount to a use of force.2 4
The determination that a use of force can embrace acts, like arming
or training guerillas, which fall short of armed force leaves open the possi-
bility that non-physically destructive cyber operations may fall within the
term's ambit. The threshold for a use of force must therefore lie some-
where along the continuum between economic and political coercion on
the one hand and acts which cause physical harm on the other.
Unfortunately, unequivocal state practice in characterizing particular
cyber attacks as (or not as) uses of force is lacking. In part, this is because
the Article 2(4) prohibition extends solely to acts of states, and very few
states have definitively been identified as the initiator of a cyber operation
that might amount to a use of force. Moreover, states may well hesitate to
label a cyber operation as a use of force out of concern that doing so
would escalate matters or otherwise destabilize the situation. Therefore,
one can only speculate as to future state practice regarding the characteri-
zation of cyber operations.
Over a decade ago, this author identified a number of factors that
would likely influence assessments by states as to whether particular cyber
operations amounted to a use of force.25 They are based on a recognition
that while states generally want to preserve their freedom of action (a mo-
tivation to keep the threshold high), they equally want to avoid any harm-
ful consequences caused by the actions of others (a motivation to keep the
threshold low). Thus, states will seek to balance these conflicting objec-
tives through consideration of factors such as those set forth below. The
approach has generally withstood the test of time.
22. See U.N. GAOR Special Comm. on Friendly Relations, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.125/SR.114 (1970).
23. Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
24. Id. 1 228.
25. See Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and Use of Force in Interna-
tional Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 885, 914-
16 (1999).
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1) Severity: Consequences involving physical harm to individuals or
property will alone amount to a use of force. Those generating only mi-
nor inconvenience or irritation will never do so. Between the extremes,
the more consequences impinge on critical national interests, the more
they will contribute to the depiction of a cyber operation as a use of force.
In this regard, the scale, scope, and duration of the consequences will
have great bearing on the appraisal of their severity. Severity is self-evi-
dently the most significant factor in the analysis.
2) Immediacy: The sooner consequences manifest, the less opportu-
nity states have to seek peaceful accommodation of a dispute or to other-
wise forestall their harmful effects. Therefore, states harbor a greater
concern about immediate consequences than those that are delayed or
build slowly over time.
3) Directness. The greater the attenuation between the initial act and
the resulting consequences, the less likely states will be to deem the actor
responsible for violating the prohibition on the use of force. Whereas the
immediacy factor focused on the temporal aspect of the consequences in
question, directness examines the chain of causation. For instance, the
eventual consequences of economic coercion (economic downturn) are
determined by market forces, access to markets, and so forth. The causal
connection between the initial acts and their effects tends to be indirect.
In armed actions, by contrast, cause and effect are closely related-an ex-
plosion, for example, directly harms people or objects.
4) Invasiveness- The more secure a targeted system, the greater the
concern as to its penetration. By way of illustration, economic coercion
may involve no intrusion at all (trade with the target state is simply cut
off), whereas in combat the forces of one state cross into another in viola-
tion of its sovereignty. The former is undeniably not a use of force,
whereas the latter always qualifies as such (absent legal justification, such
as evacuation of nationals abroad during times of unrest). In the cyber
context, this factor must be cautiously applied. In particular, cyber ex-
ploitation is a pervasive tool of modern espionage. Although highly inva-
sive, espionage does not constitute a use of force (or armed attack) under
international law absent a nonconsensual physical penetration of the tar-
get state's territory, as in the case of a warship or military aircraft which
collects intelligence from within its territorial sea or airspace. Thus, ac-
tions such as disabling cyber security mechanisms to monitor keystrokes
would, despite their invasiveness, be unlikely to be seen as a use of force.
5) Measurability: The more quantifiable and identifiable a set of con-
sequences, the more a state's interest will be deemed to have been af-
fected. On the one hand, international law does not view economic
coercion as a use of force even though it may cause significant suffering.
On the other, a military attack that causes only a limited degree of destruc-
tion clearly qualifies. It is difficult to identify or quantify the harm caused
576 [Vol. 56: p. 569
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by the former (e.g., economic opportunity costs), while doing so is
straightforward in the latter (X deaths, Y buildings destroyed, etc).
6) Presumptive legitimacy: At the risk of oversimplification, interna-
tional law is generally prohibitory in nature. In other words, acts which
are not forbidden are permitted; absent an express prohibition, an act is
presumptively legitimate. 26 For instance, it is well accepted that the inter-
national law governing the use of force does not prohibit propaganda,
psychological warfare, or espionage. To the extent such activities are con-
ducted through cyber operations, they are presumptively legitimate.
7) Responsibility: The law of state responsibility (discussed below) gov-
erns when a state will be responsible for cyber operations. But it must be
understood that responsibility lies along a continuum from operations
conducted by a state itself to those in which it is merely involved in some
fashion. The closer the nexus between a state and the operations, the
more likely other states will be inclined to characterize them as uses of
force, for the greater the risk posed to international stability.
The case of the Estonian cyber attacks can be used to illustrate appli-
cation of the approach. Although they caused no deaths, injury, or physi-
cal damage, the attacks fundamentally affected the operation of the entire
Estonian society. Government functions and services were severely dis-
rupted, the economy was thrown into turmoil, and daily life for the Esto-
nian people was negatively affected. The consequences far exceeded mere
inconvenience or irritation. The effects were immediate and, in the case
of confidence in government and economic activity, wide-spread and long-
term. They were also direct, as with the inability to access funds and inter-
ference with the distribution of government benefits. Since some of the
targeted systems were designed to be secure, the operations were highly
invasive. While the consequences were severe, they were difficult to quan-
tify, since most involved denial of service, rather than destruction of data.
Although political and economic actions are presumptively legitimate in
use-of-force terms, these operations constituted more than merely pressur-
ing the target state. Instead, they involved intentionally frustrating govern-
mental and economic functions. Taken together as a single "cyber
operation," the incident arguably reached the use-of-force threshold. Had
Russia been responsible for them under international law, it is likely that
the international community would have (or should have) treated them as
a use of force in violation of the UN Charter and customary international
law.
26. In The Case of the S.S. "Lotus", the Permanent Court of International Justice
famously asserted that "[t] he rules of law binding upon States . .. emanate from
their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as
expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations be-
tween these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the achieve-
ment of common aims." S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at
18 (Sept. 7).
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The criteria are admittedly imprecise, thereby permitting states signif-
icant latitude in characterizing a cyber operation as a use of force, or not.
In light of the increasing frequency and severity of cyber operations, a
tendency towards resolving grey areas in favor of finding a use of force can
be expected to emerge. This state practice will over time clarify the norm
and its attendant threshold.
B. Applicability of the Prohibition
By its own express terms, Article 2(4) applies solely to Members of the
United Nations. As discussed, the prohibition extends to non-Members by
virtue of customary law. That is the limit of applicability. Non-state actors,
including individuals, organized groups, and terrorist organizations, can-
not violate the norm absent a clear relationship with a state. Their actions
may be unlawful under international and domestic law, but not as a viola-
tion of the prohibition on the use of force. Thus, in the Estonian case,
and barring any evidence of Russian government involvement, none of
those individuals or groups conducting the operations violated the Article
2(4) prohibition. But when can the conduct of individuals or groups be
attributed to a state, such that the state is legally responsible for their ac-
tions? The law of state responsibility governs such situations.27
Obviously, states are legally responsible for the conduct of their gov-
ernmental organs or entities.28 This principle extends to unauthorized
acts.29 Accordingly, any cyber operation rising to the level of an unlawful
use of force will entail responsibility on the part of the state when
launched by its agents, even when they are acting ultra vires.
The fact that a state did not itself conduct the cyber operations at
hand does not mean that it escapes responsibility altogether. States are
also responsible for "the conduct of a person or group of persons ... if the
person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or
under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the con-
duct."3 0 The ICJ addressed the degree of control necessary for attribution
in the Nicaragua case. There the Court considered attribution of the acts
of the Nicaraguan Contras (a rebel group supported by the United States)
to the United States, such that the United States would be responsible for
breaches of international humanitarian law (IHL) committed by the
group. While finding the United States responsible for its own "planning,
direction and support" of the Contras,3 1 the court limited responsibility
27. This law is set forth, in non-binding form, in the International Law Com-
mission's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, in Report of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10,
2001, UN Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001) [hereinafter
Draft Articles on State Responsibility].
28. See id. art. 4, at 44.
29. See id. art. 7, at 44.
30. See id. art. 8, at 45.
31. Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 86 (June 27).
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for the Contra actions to those in which the United States exercised "effec-
tive control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which
the alleged violations were committed."32 Mere support for their activities
did not suffice.
The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) took a different tack in the Prosecutor v. Tadic"3
case, where it held that the authority of the government of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia over the Bosnia Serb armed groups "required by
international law for considering the armed conflict to be international
was overall control going beyond the mere financing and equipping of such
forces and involving also participation in the planning and supervision of
military operations."3 4 It is essential to note that although the tribunal
expressly rejected the higher Nicaragua threshold of effective control, the
technical legal issue was not state responsibility, but rather the nature of
the armed conflict. Thus, while Tadic brings Nicaragua into question by
proffering a lower threshold, it does not necessarily supplant the effective
control test.3 5 It remains unclear whether effective control, overall con-
trol, or some other test governs in international law, although the ICJ has
twice reaffirmed its version.36
In the cyber context, then, states will be responsible for violating the
prohibition on the use of force to the extent that they either direct private
individuals or groups to conduct the operations or are heavily involved in
them. Determinations will be made on a case-by-case basis by looking to
the extent and nature of involvement by the state with the group and in
the particular operations.
Even if conduct is not attributable to a state as under its control, it will
nevertheless "be considered an act of that State . .. if and to the extent
that the State acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as its
own."" The ICJ addressed this situation in the Case Concerning United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran,38 which involved seizure of
the U.S. Embassy by Iranian militants in 1979. The Iranian government
was uninvolved in the initial seizure, but later passed a decree that ac-
cepted and maintained the occupation of the embassy. According to the
ICJ, "[t]he approval given to [the occupation of the Embassy] by the
32. Id. 1 115 (emphasis added); id. 1 109.
33. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
34. Id. 1 145.
35. Although, the court in dicta suggested the test is also suitable for applica-
tion to issues of state responsibility. See id., 11 116-37.
36. See, e.g., Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J.
91, 391-92 (Feb. 26); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo)
(Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, 1 160 (Dec. 19).
37. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 27, art. 11, at 45.
38. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran (U.S. v. Iran),
1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24).
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Ayatollah Khomeini and other organs of the Iranian State, and the deci-
sion to perpetuate them, translated continuing occupation of the Embassy
and detention of the hostages into acts of that State."39
It should be cautioned that mere expressions of approval do not suf-
fice for attribution; rather, the state must somehow subsequently embrace
the actions as its own, for instance, by tangibly supporting their continu-
ance, failing to take actions to suppress them, or otherwise adopting them.
Adoption may either be express, as in the Hostages case, or implied, as
when a state engages in conduct that undeniably constitutes adoption. In
the Estonian case, had Russia publicly encouraged further attacks, it would
have borne responsibility not only for the subsequent attacks, but also
those in the initial wave.
A state may also be held responsible for the effects of unlawful acts of
private individuals or groups on its territory when it fails to take reasonably
available measures to stop such acts in breach of its obligations to other
states. In this situation, its violation is of the duty owed to other states, but
its responsibility extends to the effects of the act itself. Applying this stan-
dard in the Hostages case, the ICJ found that the Iranian government failed
to take required steps to prevent the seizure of the U.S. Embassy or regain
control over it, placing Iran in breach of its international obligation to
safeguard diplomatic premises.40 The key to such responsibility lies in the
existence of a separate legal duty to forestall the act in question, and an
ability to comply with said duty. The ICJ articulated this principle in its
very first case, Corfu Channel4 1 where it held that every state has an "obliga-
tion not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the
rights of other States." 42 Of the many obligations that states owe to each
other, ensuring their territory is not a launching pad for the use of force
or armed attacks (see discussion below) against other states certainly ranks
among the most important. The fact that a use of force consists of cyber
operations rather than traditional armed force would not diminish the
responsibility of the state involved.
Finally, consider a situation in which the effects of a cyber operation
extend beyond the targeted state. This is an especially relevant scenario in
the cyber context, for networking and other forms of interconnectivity
mean that a cyber use of force by State A against State B may have conse-
quences in State C that would rise to the level of a use of force if directed
against C. The causation of such effects would not amount to a violation
of Article 2(4) vis-A-vis C. Article 2(4)'s requirement that Members "re-
frain in their international relations"43 from the use of force implies an
element of purposely engaging in some action in respect of another speci-
39. Id. 74.
40. See id. It 76-78.
41. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
42. Id. at 22.
43. U.N. Charter art. 2(4) (emphasis added).
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fled state. Inadvertent effects caused in states other than the target state
do not constitute a form of "international relations."
However, even if the state did not intend such effects, it is clear that it
bears responsibility for them. As noted in the Draft Articles of State Re-
sponsibility, "[t]here is an internationally wrongful act of a State when
conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) [i]s attributable to the
State under international law; and (b) [c]onstitutes a breach of an inter-
national obligation of the State."" In the envisaged case, since State A
conducted the cyber operation, the action is directly attributable to it.
Further, the wrongful use of force against B would constitute a breach of
A's international obligation to refrain from the use of force. That the in-
tended "victim" was B matters not. The criterion has been met once the
breach of an international obligation has occurred. This is so even if the
effects in C were unintended. As noted in the International Law Commis-
sion's Commentary to the relevant article:
A related question is whether fault constitutes a necessary ele-
ment of the internationally wrongful act of a State. This is cer-
tainly not the case if by "fault" one understands the existence, for
example, of an intention to harm. In the absence of any specific
requirement of a mental element in terms of the primary obliga-
tion, it is only the act of a State that matters, independently of
any intention.4 5
C. Remedies for Violation
In the event of state responsibility for an unlawful act, the victim-state
is entitled to reparation, which can take the form of restitution, compensa-
tion, or satisfaction.4 6 With regard to cyber operations amounting to a use
of force, compensation could be claimed for any reasonably foreseeable
physical or financial losses. A state may also take any responsive actions
that neither amount to a use of force nor breach an existing treaty or
customary law obligation. As an example, a state may choose to block in-
coming cyber transmissions emanating from the state that has used force
against it.
44. Draft Articles of State Responsibility, supra note 27, art. 2, at 43.
45. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAw COMMISSION's ARTICLES ON
STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIEs 84 (2002).
46. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 27, arts. 34-37, at 52.
Restitution is reestablishing "the situation which existed before the wrongful act
was committed." Id. art. 35, at 52. Compensation is covering any financially assess-
able damage not made good by restitution. See id. art. 36, at 52. Satisfaction is "an
acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology or an-
other appropriate modality" that responds to shortfalls in restitution and compen-
sation when making good the injury caused. Id. art. 37, at 52.
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Additionally, the victim-state may take "countermeasures" in response
to a use of force.47 Countermeasures are "measures which would other-
wise be contrary to the international obligations of the injured State vis-d-
vis the responsible State if they were not taken by the former in response
to an internationally wrongful act by the latter in order to procure cessa-
tion and reparation."48 They are distinguished from retorsion, which is
the taking of unfriendly but lawful actions, such as the expulsion of
diplomats.
The wrong in question has to be on-going at the time of the counter-
measures, since their purpose is not to punish or provide retribution, but
instead to compel the other party to desist in its unlawful activities. 49
Countermeasures must be proportionate to the injury suffered,5 0 and the
victim-state is required to have called on the state committing the wrong to
refrain from the conduct (and make reparations if necessary), or, in the
case of acts emanating from its territory, take measures to stop them.5 '
Unlike collective self-defense (discussed below), countermeasures may
only be taken by the state suffering the wrong.52
Countermeasures involving cyber operations would be particularly ap-
propriate as a response to a cyber use of force, although the strict limita-
tions placed on countermeasures weaken their viability in situations
demanding an immediate reaction. On the other hand, it would be im-
proper to respond with a cyber operation that rose to the level of a use of
force, for "[c]ountermeasures shall not affect ... the obligation to refrain
from the threat or use of force as embodied in the Charter of the United
Nations."5 3 Responses amounting to a use of force are only permissible
when falling within the two recognized exceptions to the prohibition on
the use of force-action authorized by the Security Council and self-
defense.
Although the limitation of countermeasures to non-forceful measures
is widely accepted, in a separate opinion to the ICJ's Case Concerning Oil
Platforms5 4 judgment, Judge Simma argued for what might be labeled "self-
defense lite" in the face of an "unlawful use of force 'short of' an armed
attack . . . within the meaning of Article 51."65 For Judge Simma, such
"defensive military action 'short of full scale self-defence" is of a "more
limited range and quality of response" than that which is lawful in re-
47. See id. art. 49(1), at 56; see also Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v.
Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7, 55-56 (Sept. 25); Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
249 (June 27).
48. Report of the Int'l Law Comm'n, supra note 27, at 324.
49. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 27, art. 52(3) (a), at
57-58.
50. See id. art. 51, at 57.
51. See id. art. 52(1), at 57.
52. See Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 11 211, 252.
53. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 27, art. 50(1)(a), at 57.
54. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161 (Nov. 6).
55. Id. at 331 (separate opinion of Judge Simma).
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sponse to an armed attack in the self-defense context. The key difference
with classic self-defense is that Judge Simma would exclude collective ac-
tions.56 Reduced to basics, he is arguing for normative acceptance of
forceful countermeasures.
The core problem with the approach is that it posits a tiered forceful
response scheme. However, because the intensity of a defensive response
is already governed, as will be discussed below, by the principle of propor-
tionality, all that is really occurring is a relaxation of the threshold for
engaging in forceful defensive actions. Such an approach is counter-tex-
tual, for the combined effect of Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter is
to rule out forcible responses by states against actions other than "armed
attacks." Nevertheless, acceptance of such an approach by states would be
significant in the cyber context because by it cyber operations, which
themselves would be a use of force under Article 2(4), may be launched in
reaction to a cyber use of force that did not rise to the level of an armed
attack under Article 51.
III. AUTHORIZATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Pursuant to Article 39 of the UN Charter, the Security Council is em-
powered to determine that a particular situation amounts to a "threat to
the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression." When it does, the
Council "shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be
taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore inter-
national peace and security." Articles 41 and 42 set forth, respectively,
non-forceful and forceful options for responding to such situations.
The scope of the phrase "threat to the peace, breach of the peace or
act of aggression" has been the subject of much attention in international
law. Breach of the peace would seemingly require the outbreak of vio-
lence; cyber operations harming individuals or property would reasonably
qualify, but whether those falling short of this level would do so is uncer-
tain. As to aggression, in 1974 the General Assembly adopted a resolution
in which it characterized "aggression" as ranging from the "use of armed
force" and blockade to allowing one's territory to be used by another state
to commit an act of aggression and sending armed bands against another
state.57 A cyber operation causing significant physical harm in another
state would certainly rise to this level; whether others would is unclear.
This ambiguity is essentially irrelevant in light of the "threat to the
peace" criterion. Little guidance exists on those acts which qualify, al-
though they must be conceptually distinguished from activities constitut-
ing threats of the use of force in contravention of Article 2(4). In Tadic,
the ICTY opined that a threat to the peace should be assessed with regard
to the Purposes of the United Nations delineated in Article 1 and the Prin-
56. See id. at 331-33.
57. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Annex art. 3, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974).
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ciples set forth in Article 2.58 This is a singularly unhelpful proposition,
since said Purposes and Principles include such intangibles as developing
friendly relations and solving social problems.
In fact, a finding that a situation is a threat to the peace is a political
decision, not a legal one. It signals the Security Council's willingness to
involve itself in a particular matter. There are no territorial limits on situa-
tions which may constitute threats to the peace, although they logically
tend to be viewed as those which transcend borders, or risk doing so. Nor
is there a limitation to acts conducted by or at the behest of states; for
instance, the Council has repeatedly found transnational terrorism to be a
threat to the peace.59 No violence or other harmful act need have oc-
curred before the Council may make a threat to the peace determination.
Most importantly, since there is no mechanism for reviewing threat to the
peace determinations, the Council's authority in this regard is unfettered.
Simply put, a threat to the peace is whatever the Council deems it to be.
This being so, the Council may label any cyber operation a threat to the
peace (or breach of peace or act of aggression), no matter how
insignificant.
Once it does, the Security Council may, under Article 41, authorize
measures "not involving the use of armed force" necessary to maintain or
restore international peace and security. Article 41 offers a number of
examples, including "complete or partial interruption of economic rela-
tions and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio or other means of com-
munication." Interruption of cyber communications would necessarily be
included. An interruption could be broad in scope, as in blocking cyber
traffic to or from a country, or surgical, as in denying a particular group
access to the Internet. Any other cyber operations judged necessary would
likewise be permissible. Given the qualifier "armed force," operations re-
sulting in physical harm to persons or objects could not be authorized
pursuant to Article 41.
Should the Council determine that Article 41 measures are proving
ineffective, or if before authorizing them it decides that such measures
would be fruitless, it may, pursuant to Article 42, "take such action by air,
sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international
peace and security." The reference to operations by "air, sea, or land
forces" plainly contemplates forceful military action, although a Security
Council resolution authorizing the use of force will typically be framed in
58. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Mo-
tion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 1 29 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the For-
mer Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
59. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1618, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1618 (Aug. 4, 2005); S.C. Res.
1611, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1611 (July 7, 2005); S.C. Res. 1530, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1530 (Mar. 11, 2004); S.C. Res. 1516, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1516 (Nov. 20, 2003); S.C.
Res. 1465, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1465 (Feb. 13, 2003); S.C. Res. 1450, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/1450 (Dec. 13, 2002); S.C. Res. 1440, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1440 (Oct. 24, 2002);
S.C. Res. 1438, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1438 (Oct. 14, 2002); S.C. Res. 1377, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1377 (Nov. 12, 2001).
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terms of taking "all necessary measures." To the extent that military force
can be authorized, it is self-evident that cyber operations may be as well. It
would be lawful to launch them alone or as an aspect of a broader tradi-
tional military operation. The sole limiting factors would be the require-
ment to comply with other norms of international law, such as the IHL
prohibition on attacking the civilian population,60 and the requirement to
restrict operations to those within the scope of the particular authoriza-
tion or mandate issued by the Council. Article 42 actions are not limited
territorially or with regard to the subject of the sanctions. For example, it
would undoubtedly be within the power of the Council to authorize cyber
attacks against transnational terrorist groups (e.g., in order to disrupt lo-
gistics or command and control). It is important to emphasize that the
measures only extend to restoring peace if breached, or maintaining it
when threatened. No authority exists for taking punitive measures.
Pursuant to Article 25 of the Charter, UN Members "agree to accept
and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the
present Charter." This obligation applies even in the face of conflicting
domestic or international legal obligations.6 1 Consequently, if the Coun-
cil ordered restrictions, for example, on cyber communications, individual
states would be obligated to abide by them and ensure, to the extent feasi-
ble, their enforcement on their territory. How they do so is not the con-
cern of the Council, so long as its decision is respected.
Since the United Nations does not itself control cyber networks or
have the capability to mount cyber operations, it would have to rely on
states to effectuate any cyber related resolutions. Originally, it was envi-
sioned that the Security Council would have dedicated forces at its dispo-
sal to conduct Article 42 operations pursuant to "special agreements" with
contributing countries.62 Such arrangements have never been executed.
The Council has instead relied upon authorizations granted to individual
states, ad hoc coalitions of states, security organizations such as NATO, or
UN forces consisting of troop contributions from its Members. State prac-
tice has established that no obligation exists for states to provide military
forces or finance specific operations that have been authorized. There-
fore, if the Council were to endorse specific defensive or offensive cyber
operations under Article 42, it would be wholly dependent on the willing-
ness of states to provide the necessary cyber assets and forces to execute
them.
Finally, it must be recalled that the entire UN collective security sys-
tem depends on the readiness of the five Permanent Members of the Se-
curity Council (P5) to allow for action by refraining from exercise of their
60. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts arts. 48,
51, 52, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 25-27 [hereinafter AP I].
61. See U.N. Charter art. 103.
62. Id. art. 43.
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veto right.6 3 In light of Russia's and China's presence on the Council
(cyber operations regularly emanate from their territory), this limitation
may well prove the greatest obstacle to effective UN action in the face of
those cyber operations which would in some fashion endanger interna-
tional stability.
IV. SELF-DEFENSE
The second recognized exception to the prohibition on the use of
force is the right of states to take forceful actions to defend themselves.
This customary international law right is codified in Article 51 of the UN
Charter. In relevant part, it provides that "[n]othing in the present Char-
ter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security." The article is the conditio sine qua non of the Charter,
for although Articles 41 and 42 provide Member States some degree of
protection from attack, their provisions rely upon implementation by the
Security Council. Article 51 represents an essential safeguard in the event
the collective security mechanism fails (or proves insufficiently timely), for
it provides a means of defense requiring no Security Council approval. In
practice, the right of self-defense has proven the principal means by which
states ensure their security.
The right of self-defense bears solely on the remedies available to the
victim of an armed attack, since all such attacks are "uses of force" in the
context of Article 2(4) and customary law, with their legality determined
by reference to those norms. By contrast, the issue in self-defense is the
lawfulness of a forceful defensive response (including its nature, intensity,
duration, and scope) that would otherwise constitute an unlawful use of
force by a state. This being so, it has no bearing on passive cyber defenses,
which merely block attacks; all such defenses are lawful. It is only in the
case of active defenses, whether kinetic or cyber in nature, that the law of
self-defense comes into play by directly imposing physical costs on the
group or state launching an attack.6 4
Further, states alone enjoy the right of self-defense. Private entities,
such as a corporation that has been subjected to a hostile cyber attack,
cannot respond pursuant to the law of self-defense regardless of its sever-
ity. Their responses would be governed by domestic and international
criminal law norms. However, cyber attacks against a state's nationals may
63. See id. art. 27(3).
64. Note that one of the recommendations of the experts in the NATO 2020
report was that "NATO should plan to mount a fully adequate array of cyber de-
fence capabilities, including passive and active elements." NATO 2020, supra note
7, at 45. It should be noted, however, that passive defenses must nevertheless com-
port with other aspects of international law. See, e.g., Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Wall), Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9).
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sometimes qualify as an armed attack on the state itself; there is no re-
quirement in international law that state property or organizations be
targeted. In such a case, the state may respond forcefully in self-defense
should it choose to do so.
A. Armed Attack
The key text in Article 51, and the foundational concept of the cus-
tomary law right of self-defense, is "armed attack." But for an armed at-
tack, states enjoy no right to respond forcefully to a cyber operation
directed against them, even if that operation amounts to an unlawful use
of force. This dichotomy was intentional, for it comports with the general
presumption permeating the Charter scheme against the use of force, es-
pecially unilateral action. In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ acknowledged the
existence of this gap between the notions of use of force and armed attack
when it recognized that there are "measures which do not constitute an
armed attack but may nevertheless involve a use of force" and distin-
guished "the most grave forms of the use of force from other less grave
forms."6 5 Recall that the court specifically excluded the supply of weapons
and logistical support to rebels from the ambit of armed attack, but noted
that such actions might constitute uses of force.6 6 Simply put, all armed
attacks are uses of force, but not all uses of force qualify as armed attacks.
As a result of the gap, the remedies for a use of force not meeting the
threshold of armed attack are limited to lawful, non-forceful actions and
countermeasures or recourse to the Security Council. What this means in
practical terms is that, absent Security Council authorization, a state sub-
jected to a use of force may not respond in kind unless the use of force
rises to the level of an armed attack. In light of the difficulties of identify-
ing the source of a cyber operation, this cautious two-tiered system is espe-
cially appropriate in the cyber context. It is important to emphasize,
however, that once it is established that an armed attack has occurred, no
authorization from the Security Council is necessary before defensive ac-
tions, including those involving destructive cyber operations, may be
mounted.
Consistent with the use of force prohibition, the Charter drafters
elected an instrument-based approach to articulating the right of self-de-
fense. And as with that norm, the intent was to preclude certain conse-
quences (in this case, a premature forceful reaction by a state threatened
with harm that would itself threaten community stability), while neverthe-
less allowing states to react forcefully when the consequences justified as
much. But, again, the possibility of devastating consequences caused by a
non-kinetic cyber attack was obviously not considered during the drafting
65. Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 191, 210 (June 27); accord Oil
Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 186-87 (Nov. 6).
66. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 195.
19
Schmitt: Cyber Operations and the Jud Ad Bellum Revisited
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2011
VILLANOVA ILAW REVIEW
process. Had it been, the drafters would surely have allowed for defense
in the face of the severe consequences that can be caused by such attacks.
There is a problem in extending the notion of armed attack to ad-
dress cyber attack operations of this magnitude. The facts that the use of
force language in Article 2(4) is not qualified by the term "armed" and
that the phrase "use of force" has been authoritatively interpreted as not
necessarily implying a kinetic action allow for interpretive leeway, and the
resulting application of the seven factors set forth above. By contrast, the
phrase "armed attack" tolerates little interpretive latitude.
Clearly, an armed attack includes kinetic military force. Applying the
consequence-based approach, armed attack must also be understood in
terms of the effects typically associated with the term "armed." The es-
sence of an armed operation is the causation, or risk thereof, of death of
or injury to persons or damage to or destruction of property and other
tangible objects. Therefore, while an armed attack need not be carried
out through the instrument of classic military force, its consequences (or
likely consequences but for successful defensive action) must be analogous
to those resulting from its employment. A cyber operation that does not
risk these results may qualify as an unlawful use of force, but will not com-
prise an armed attack permitting forceful defensive action.
In light of the grave consequences that cyber operations can cause
without physically harming persons or objects, this interpretation may
seem wholly unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, it is the extant law. It must be
acknowledged that states victimized by massive cyber attacks, similar to or
more aggravated than those suffered by Estonia, may choose to treat them
as justifying a forceful response. If state practice along these lines became
widespread and well-accepted, the Article 51 norm would shift accordingly
through the natural process by which existing international law remains
current. For the moment, that has not occurred.
Cyber operations that accompany military action otherwise constitut-
ing an armed attack have no bearing on the nature of the attack. For
instance, cyber attacks would likely be conducted against enemy command
and control or air defense systems as an element of a broader military
operation. They can be responded to forcefully, regardless of whether
they independently qualify as an armed attack, because they are a compo-
nent of the overall military action. Similarly, cyber operations that are
part of a lawful military response to an armed attack are obviously permis-
sible so long as they comply with IHL, such as the prohibition on attacking
civilians or civilian objects.6 7 On the other hand, cyber operations need
not accompany classic military operations. A cyber attack standing alone
will comprise an armed attack when the consequence threshold is
reached. Equally, states subjected to an armed attack may elect to respond
solely with cyber operations.
67. See AP I, supra note 60, arts. 48, 51, 52, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 25-27.
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In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ noted that not all attacks qualify as
armed attacks, citing the case of "a mere frontier incident."68 According
to the court, an armed attack must exhibit certain "scale and effects." Un-
fortunately, the court failed to prescribe criteria by which to resolve
whether an attack meets the armed attack threshold. Not only has this
proposition been fairly criticized, but in the Oil Platforms case the court
itself admitted that the mining of even a single ship could amount to an
armed attack giving rise to the right of self-defense.69 Consequently, by
contemporary international law, qualitative indicators of attack (death, in-
jury, damage, or destruction) are more reliable in identifying those ac-
tions likely to be characterized as an armed attack than quantitative ones
(number of deaths or extent of destruction). So long as a cyber operation
is likely to result in the requisite consequences, it is an armed attack.
With regard to cyber operations, it must be cautioned that the mere
destruction or damage (alteration) of data would not suffice. Were it to,
the armed attack threshold would be so reduced that the vast majority of
cyber operations would qualify as armed attacks. Rather, to comport with
the accepted understanding of "armed attack," the destruction of or dam-
age to the data would have to result in physical consequences, as in caus-
ing a generator to overheat and catch fire or rendering a train or subway
uncontrollable such that it crashed. Destruction of data designed to be
immediately convertible into tangible objects, like banking data, could
also be reasonably encompassed within the scope of "armed attacks." But
the destruction of or damage to data, standing alone, would not rise to the
level of an armed attack.
It is sometimes argued that a cyber operation directed against a na-
tion's military capability necessarily constitutes an armed attack. If the at-
tack is physically destructive, there is no question that this is so. But the
mere fact that cyber operations "compromise the ability of units of the
DOD to perform DOD's mission" does not alone suffice.70 Only when
non-destructive cyber operations indicate that an attack is imminent ("pre-
paring the battlefield") or represent the first step in an attack that is un-
derway (as in bringing down an air defense radar network to facilitate
penetration of enemy airspace) are forceful actions in self-defense permis-
sible. Obviously, it may be difficult to determine whether a particular
cyber operation against military assets is either an indication or a compo-
nent of attack; yet, that is a practical problem which does not affect the
norm itself. As with the challenge of identifying an attacker or determin-
68. Nicaragua (Nicar v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 195.
69. See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. at 195-96; see also YORAM DIN-
STEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 194-96 (4th ed. 2005); William H. Taft
IV, Self-Defense and the Oil Platforms Decision, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 295, 300 (2004).
70. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TECHNOLOGY, PoLIcY, LAw, AND ETHICS REGARD-
ING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATrACK CAPABILITIES 245 (William A.
Owens, Kenneth W. Dam & Herbert S. Lin eds., 2009).
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ing when attack is imminent (discussed below), the legal issue is whether
the defender's conclusion is reasonable in the circumstances.
Finally, a cyber use of force by State A against State B may generate
"bleed-over" effects in State C. This situation does not, as noted earlier,
constitute a use of force against C, although A would nevertheless be re-
sponsible for the consequences caused. However, if the effects in C rise to
the level of those qualifying as an armed attack, C may respond in self-
defense against State A, even though C was not the intended target of the
attack.7 1
The distinction arises from the fact that while the use of force prohi-
bition solely pertains to the issue of whether there has been a particular
violation of international law, the law of self-defense addresses whether a
victim-state enjoys the right to employ force to protect itself. It would be
incongruous to suggest that a state was barred from acting defensively
when subjected to such effects. From its perspective (the correct vantage
point in interpreting the law of self-defense), what matters is deterring or
stopping the harmful actions; the intention of the actor is but a secondary
consideration. Of course, the defensive actions must meet the criteria of
self-defense set forth below, in particular the requirement that a forceful
response be "necessary." Because C was not the intended target of the
attack, it may suffice to simply notify A that it is suffering effects from the
attack on B and demand that A takes steps to arrest them.
B. Anticipatory Self-Defense
Textually, Article 51 addresses only those situations where an armed
attack is underway. Nevertheless, it is well-accepted that a state need not
sit idly by as the enemy prepares to attack; instead, a state may defend itself
once attack is "imminent."72 The generally accepted standard of immi-
nency was articulated in the nineteenth century by Secretary of State
71. As the right of self-defense extends to armed attacks by non-state actors,
an identical conclusion would apply to actions they undertake against one state
having effects in another.
72. Acceptance of the standard is not universal. For instance, Professor
Yoram Dinstein argues against its existence, suggesting instead that such actions
are better seen as "interceptive self-defense." He notes that "an interceptive strike
counters an armed attack which is in progress, even if it is still incipient: the blow is
'imminent' and practically 'unavoidable.'" DINsTEIN, supra note 69, at 191. It
might also be noted that whereas the notion of armed attack was interpreted with
fidelity to the Charter text, this article accepts an interpretation of self-defense
which runs contrary to the precise text of the UN Charter. The apparent inconsis-
tency can be justified in a number of ways. Note that Article 51 refers to the "in-
herent" right of self-defense, which has been interpreted as either pre-existing
(and thereby maintained in the Charter) or as inherent in the illogic of requiring
States to suffer a potentially devastating strike before acting in self-defense. Addi-
tionally, Article 2 of the Definition of Aggression resolution provides that the first
use of force is merely prima facie evidence of an act of aggression. See Definition
of Aggression, supra note 57, art. 2. As such, it contemplates the possibility of a
first use which does not qualify as an armed attack and which, therefore, can only
be justified in terms of anticipatory self-defense.
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Daniel Webster following the famous Caroline incident. In correspon-
dence with his British counterpart regarding an incursion into U.S. terri-
tory to attack Canadian rebels during the Mackenzie Rebellion, Webster
opined that the right of self-defense applied only when "the necessity of
that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no moment for de-
liberation."7 3 Although the incident actually had nothing to do with ac-
tions taken in anticipation of attack (the attacks in question were
ongoing), Webster's formulation has survived as the classic expression of
the temporal threshold for anticipatory defensive actions; 74 indeed, the
Nuremberg Tribunal cited the Caroline case with approval.75
Following the events of September 11th, 2001, the United States sug-
gested that a new self-defense paradigm was needed. As President Bush
noted in his 2002 National Security Strategy:
For centuries, international law recognized that nations
need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to
defend themselves against forces that present an imminent dan-
ger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often con-
ditioned the legitimacy of pre-emption on the existence of an
imminent threat-most often a visible mobilization of armies, na-
vies, and air forces preparing to attack.
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capa-
bilities and objectives of today's adversaries. Rogue states and
terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means.
They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of
terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction-
weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and
used without warning.76
His conclusion was that the "greater the threat, the greater is the risk
of inaction-and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory ac-
tion to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and
place of the enemy's attack."77 The United States has maintained this ap-
proach to the present.7 8
73. Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec'y of State, to Lord Ashburton, Brit-
ish Special Minister (Aug. 6, 1842), reprinted in 2 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST
or INTERNATIONAL LAw 412 (1906).
74. See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST
THREATS AND ARMED ATrACKS 97 (2002).
75. See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sen-
tences, Oct. 1, 1946, reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 205 (1947).
76. THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002).
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 18 (2006). The Obama National Security Strategy does
not expressly adopt the doctrine of pre-emption, but nor is it rejected. It specifi-
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Despite being characterized by some as revolutionary, even unlawful,
the pre-emption doctrine represented a reasonable accommodation to the
changed circumstances cited by the President. Indeed, it is arguable that
the approach represented a de minimus departure from existing law. The
underlying premise of anticipatory self-defense is that to effectively defend
themselves, states must sometimes act before an aggressive blow falls. Tra-
ditionally, a standard requiring temporal proximity to the armed attack
had been employed to assess the need. The underlying intent of the stan-
dard was to allow as much opportunity as possible for non-forceful mea-
sures to work in alleviating the crisis. Yet, as correctly noted in the
National Security Strategy, the modus operandi of terrorists is to strike with-
out warning, thereby denuding the opportunity the victim-state has to an-
ticipatorily defend itself.
In such circumstances, the most reasonable accommodation of the
law of self-defense to both the changed threat and to international law's
rebuttable presumption against the legality of using force lies in restricting
the victim-state from acting forcefully in self-defense until the point at
which its window of opportunity to mount an effective defense is about to
close. The imminency criterion should therefore not be measured by ref-
erence to the moment of armed attack, but rather with regard to the point
at which a state must act defensively, lest it be too late.7 9
The "last feasible window of opportunity" standard must not be inter-
preted as permitting preventive strikes, that is, those against a prospective
attacker who lacks either the means to carry out an attack or the intent to
do so. The fact that an overtly hostile state is capable of launching cyber
attacks-even devastating ones-does not alone entitle a potential victim
to act defensively with force. Such hostility must mature into an actual
decision to attack. The decision may be evidenced by, for example, pre-
paratory cyber operations amounting to a demonstration of "hostile in-
tent."80 Moreover, the circumstances must be such that the pending
attack has to be responded to immediately if the victim-state is to have any
reasonable hope of fending it off. Consider a state's introduction of cyber
vulnerabilities into another state's critical infrastructure. Such an action
might amount to a use of force, but the victim-state may not react force-
fully until it reasonably concludes that: 1) its opponent has decided to
cally reserves the right to act unilaterally. See 2010 NATIONAL SECURrIY STRATEGY,
supra note 6, at 22.
79. For a fuller discussion, see Michael N. Schmitt, Responding to Transnational
Terrorism under theJus ad Bellum: A Normative Framework, 56 NAVAL L. REv. 1, 16-19
(2008).
80. The U.S. Standing Rules of Engagement define hostile intent as "[t]he
threat of imminent use of force against the United States, US forces, or other des-
ignated persons or property. It also includes the threat of force to preclude or
impede the mission and/or duties of US forces, including the recovery of US per-
sonnel or vital USG property." CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUC-
TIONs, CJCSI 3121.01B, STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT/STANDING RULES FOR THE
USE OF FORCE FOR U.S. FORCES, at A-4(2005).
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actually exploit those vulnerabilities; 2) the strike is likely to generate con-
sequences at the armed attack level; and 3) it must act immediately to
defend itself. Until arriving at these conclusions, the victim-state's re-
sponse would be limited to non-forceful measures, including countermea-
sures, and referral of the matter to the Security Council.
Although transnational terrorism represents the obvious justification
for the approach, cyber operations present many of the same challenges
to application of the traditional temporal criterion. Like terrorism, cyber
operations are typically launched without any warning that attack is immi-
nent. The time between launch of an operation and impact is measured
in seconds at most, thereby often depriving the victim of an opportunity to
foil the initial attack as it is unfolding; viable defenses could resultantly be
limited to passive measures, such as firewalls and antivirus software. More-
over, although the immediate severity of a cyber armed attack may not
reach the level of attacks with weapons of mass destruction, cyber opera-
tions have the potential, because of networking, to affect many more indi-
viduals and activities. In light of these realities, an approach centering on
a state's opportunity to defend itself is no less suitable in the context of
cyber operations than in that of terrorism. Cyber or kinetic operations
designed to foil an attack which has been approved, and which qualifies as
an armed attack, would therefore be lawful when it reasonably appears
that failure to act promptly will deprive the target State of any viable op-
portunity to defend itself.
C. Criteria for Engaging in Self-Defense
Actions in self-defense must meet two legal criteria-necessity and
proportionality. The ICJ acknowledged both in the Nicaragua case, and
later confirmed them in its Oil Platforms judgement.8 1 Necessity requires
that there be no reasonable option other than force to effectively deter an
imminent attack or defeat one that is underway. This does not mean that
force need represent the only available response; it merely requires that
defense necessitate actions that are forceful in nature as a component of
an overall response, which may well also include non-forceful measures
such as diplomacy, economic sanctions, or law enforcement measures.
Proportionality, by contrast, addresses the issue of how much force is
permissible once it is deemed necessary. The criterion limits the scale,
scope, duration, and intensity of the defensive response to that which is
required to neutralize a prospective attack or repel one that is underway.
It does not restrict the amount of force used to that employed in the
armed attack, since more force may be needed to successfully conduct a
defense; of course, less may suffice. In addition, there is no requirement
that the defensive force be of the same nature as that constituting the
armed attack. Cyber operations may be responded to with kinetic opera-
81. See Oil Platforns (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 183, 196-98 (Nov. 6); Nicara-
gua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 194 (June 27).
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tions and vice versa. The point of reference is the need to effectively de-
fend oneself, not the character of the armed attack.
The key to the necessity analysis in the cyber context is the existence,
or lack thereof, of alternative, non-forceful courses of action. Should pas-
sive cyber defenses be adequate to thwart a cyber armed attack, forceful
defensive measures would be disallowed. Similarly, if active cyber opera-
tions not rising to the level of force are adequate to deter armed attacks
(prospective or ongoing), forceful alternatives, whether cyber or kinetic,
would be barred. However, when non-forceful measures alone cannot rea-
sonably be expected to defeat an armed attack and prevent subsequent
ones, destructive cyber and kinetic operations are permissible under the
law of self-defense.
Any forceful defensive cyber or kinetic operations must equally be
proportionate. The victim of a cyber armed attack does not have carte
blanche to conduct its cyber or kinetic defense. Rather, the extent and
nature of its response are limited to ensuring the victim-state is no longer
subject to attack. The requirement should not be overstated. It may be
that the source of the cyber armed attack is relatively invulnerable to cyber
operations. This would not preclude kinetic or cyber defensive operations
against other targets in an effort to compel the attacker to desist, although
they must be scaled to that purpose.
D. Evidentiary Issues
Identification of an "attacker" poses particular problems in the cyber
context. For instance, it is possible to "spoof' the origin of attack; the lone
indication of where an attack originated from, or who launched it, may be
an IP address or other machine discernable data. And the speed by which
cyber operations proceed dramatically compresses the time available to
make such determinations. How certain must the target state be as to the
identity of its attacker before responding in self-defense?
Although international law sets no specific evidentiary standard for
drawing conclusions as to the originator of an armed attack, a potentially
useful formula was contained in the U.S. notification to the Security Coun-
cil that it was acting in self-defense when it launched its October 2001
attacks against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. There, U.S. Am-
bassador Negroponte stated that "my Government has obtained clear and
compelling information that the Al-Qaeda organization, which is sup-
ported by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, had a central role in the
attacks."8 2 NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson used the same lan-
guage when announcing that the attacks of 9/11 fell within the ambit of
82. Permanent Rep. of the United States of America to the U.N., Letter dated
7 October 2001 from the Permanent Rep. of the United States of America to the
United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/
2001/946 (Oct. 7, 2001) [hereinafter U.S. Rep. Letter].
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the collective defense provisions of Article V of the North Atlantic
Treaty.83
"Clear and compelling" is a threshold higher than the preponderance
of the evidence (more likely than not) standard used in certain civil and
administrative proceedings and lower than criminal law's "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt." In essence, it obliges a state to act reasonably, that is, in a
fashion consistent with the normal state practice in same or similar cir-
cumstances. Reasonable states neither respond precipitously on the basis
of sketchy indications of who has attacked them nor sit back passively until
they have gathered unassailable evidence. So long as the victim-state has
taken reasonable steps to identify the perpetrator of an armed attack,
cyber or kinetic, and has drawn reasonable conclusions based on the re-
sults of those efforts, it may respond forcefully in self-defense. That the
state in fact drew the wrong conclusion is of no direct relevance to the
question of whether it acted lawfully in self-defense.8 4 Its responses are
assessed as of the time it took action, not ex post facto.
Although the temporal aspect cannot be ignored, the time available
to make the determination is merely one factor bearing on the reasonable-
ness of any conclusion. In particular, automatic "hack-back" systems that
might involve a response amounting to a use of force are neither necessa-
rily lawful nor unlawful. Their use must be judged in light of many factors,
such as the reliability of the determination of origin, the damage caused
by the attack, and the range of available response options.
An analogous standard of reasonableness would apply in the case of
anticipatory self-defense against an imminent cyber attack. International
law does not require either certainty or absolute precision in anticipating
another state's (or non-state actor's) future actions. Rather, it requires
reasonableness in concluding that a potential attacker has decided to at-
tack and wields the capability to carry out said attack, and that it must act
defensively in anticipation of the attack lest it lose the opportunity to effec-
tively defend itself. States could not possibly countenance a higher thresh-
old, for such a standard would deprive them of a meaningful right of self-
defense.
Admittedly, ascertaining a possible adversary's intentions in the cyber
environment is likely to be demanding. Aside from the difficulties of accu-
rately pinpointing identity discussed above, it will be challenging in the
context of anticipatory self-defense to identify the purpose behind a par-
ticular cyber operation. For instance, is a cyber probe of a state's air de-
83. See NATO Sec'y Gen. Lord Robertson, Statement at NATO Headquarters
(Oct. 2, 2001), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011002a.
htm.
84. Note by way of analogy to international criminal law, that pursuant to the
Statute of the International Criminal Court, a mistake of fact is grounds for exclud-
ing criminal responsibility when the mistake negates the mental element required
by the crime. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 32(1),July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 108.
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fense designed merely to gather intelligence or instead to locate
vulnerabilities in anticipation of an attack which is about to be launched?
Obviously, such determinations must be made contextually, considering
factors such as the importance of the matter in contention, degree of po-
litical tensions, statements by military and political leaders, military activi-
ties like deployments, exercises and mobilizations, failed efforts to resolve
a contentious situation diplomatically, and so forth. The speed with which
the defender may have to make such an assessment to effectively defend
itself further complicates matters. Despite the factual and practical com-
plexity, the legal standard is clear; a state acting anticipatorily in self-de-
fense must do so reasonably. In other words, states in the same or similar
circumstances would react defensively.
When a state asserts that it is acting in self-defense, it bears the bur-
den of proof. In the Oil Platforms case, the ICJ noted that the United
States had failed to present evidence sufficient to 'justify its using force in
self-defense"8 5 Specifically, it could not demonstrate that Iran was respon-
sible for a 1987 missile attack against an oil tanker sailing under U.S. flag
or the 1988 mining of a U.S. warship during the Iran-Iraq "tanker war," to
which the United States responded by attacking Iranian oil platforms.
The court rejected evidence offered by the United States which was merely
"suggestive," looking instead for "direct evidence" or, reframed, "conclu-
sive evidence."86 "Clear and compelling" evidence would meet these re-
quirements. Thus, states responding to a cyber armed attack must be
prepared to present evidence of this quality as to the source and nature of
an impending attack, while those acting in anticipation of an attack must
do likewise with regard to the potential attacker's intent and capability.
E. Collective Responses
Unlike countermeasures, defensive actions may be collective. This
possibility is explicitly provided for in Article 51's reference to "individual
or collective self-defense." Collective self-defense may be mounted to-
gether by states which have all been attacked or individually by a state (or
states) which has not, but comes to the defense of another. Although the
basic norm is clear in theory, it is complex in application. As noted in the
Group of Experts' Report on the new NATO Strategic Concept, "there
may well be doubts about whether an unconventional danger-such as a
cyber attack or evidence that terrorists are planning a strike-triggers the
collective defence mechanisms of Article 5 [the North Atlantic Treaty im-
plementation of Article 51]."87
The mere fact of an armed attack allows for collective defensive ac-
tion; no authorization from the Security Council is necessary. But there
are legal limits on the exercise of the right. In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ
85. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. at 189.
86. Id. at 189-90, 194.
87. NATO 2020, supra note 7, at 20.
596 [Vol. 56: p. 569
28
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol56/iss3/10
2011] CYBER OPERATIONS AND THE JUS AD BELLUM REVISITED 597
suggested that only the victim-state is empowered to determine whether an
armed attack has occurred, and it must request assistance before others
act on its behalf.8 8 Absent such a determination and request, collective
actions would themselves amount to unlawful uses of force, and, depend-
ing on their nature, even armed attacks (paradoxically, against the state
launching the initial armed attack). These requirements are designed to
prevent states from claiming to act in collective self-defense as a subter-
fuge for aggression.
Given the practical difficulties of identifying a cyber operation's origi-
nator, this is a sensible limitation. It must be noted that some distin-
guished commentators challenge the strict application of these
requirements. They argue that in cases where the collective self-defense
actions occur outside the territory of the victim-state, other states may be
entitled to act on the basis of their own right to ensure their security. The
right arguably derives from a breach of the duty to refrain from armed
attack that the state initiating the armed attack bears.89 This latter scena-
rio is particularly germane in the cyber context since the effects of cyber
armed attacks could easily spread through networks, thereby endangering
states other than those which are the intended target. The prevailing view
is nevertheless that there must be a request from the victim-state before
the right of collective self-defense matures.
In many cases, a pre-existing treaty contemplates collective self-de-
fense. Article 52(1) of the UN Charter provides that "nothing in the pre-
sent Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies
for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international
peace and security as are appropriate for regional action . . . ." Despite the
reference to "regional" arrangements, the agreements need not be limited
to states in a particular region or to actions occurring in a defined area.
Such arrangements may take multiple forms. For instance, bilateral and
multilateral mutual assistance treaties typically provide that the Parties will
treat an armed attack against one of them as an armed attack against all.9 0
As a practical matter, the effectiveness of collective self-defense provisions
usually depends on the willingness of the treaty partners to come to each
other's aid. A state that does not see collective self-defensive action as in
88. See Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 199 (June 27). The Court
reiterated this position in the Oil Platforms case of 2003. See Oil Platforms (Iran v.
U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. at 188.
89. See DINSTEIN, supra note 69, at 270. This was the position adopted in
Judge Jenning's dissent in Nicaragua. See Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. at
544-46 (dissenting opinion of Judge Sir Robert Jennings).
90. For instance, the Japan-United States mutual defense treaty provides that
"[e]ach Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories
under the administration ofJapan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety
and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its
constitutional provisions and processes." Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Secur-
ity Between Japan and the United States of America, U.S.-Japan, art. V, Jan. 19,
1960, 11 U.S.T. 1632.
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its national interest may be expected to contest characterization of a cyber
operation as an armed attack.
Military alliances based on the right to engage in collective self-de-
fense also exist, the paradigmatic example being the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). Pursuant to Article V of the treaty, Member States
agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Eu-
rope or North America shall be considered an attack against
them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed at-
tack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or
collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of
the United Nations, will assist the [Member State] or [Member
States] so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in con-
cert with the other [Member States], such action as it deems nec-
essary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain
the security of the North Atlantic area.9 1
The benefit of alliances is that they generally involve a degree of ad-
vanced planning for combined operations in the event of armed attack,
and, as with NATO, military structures are often set up to coordinate and
direct military operations. Preplanning and the existence of collective
mechanisms for managing joint and combined action are especially valua-
ble with regard to defending against cyber attacks. However, like mutual
assistance treaties, alliance arrangements are subject to the reality that
they are composed of states, which can be expected to act pursuant to
their own national interests. In the case of NATO, for instance, decisions
to act are taken by consensus in the North Atlantic Council; a single Mem-
ber State can therefore block NATO collective action. Indeed, had the
cyber operations against Estonia risen to the level of an armed attack, it is
not altogether certain that NATO would have come to its defense milita-
rily, especially in light of Russia's place in the European security environ-
ment and the countervailing commitments of NATO allies elsewhere,
especially Afghanistan and Iraq.
F. State Sponsorship of Attacks by Non-State Actors
The issue of state sponsorship of cyber operations was addressed ear-
lier in the context of the responsibility of states for uses of force by non-
state actors. There the question was, When does a state violate the use of
force prohibition by virtue of its relationship with others who conduct
cyber operations? However, the issue of state sponsorship in the self-de-
fense context is much more momentous. It asks when may forceful defen-
sive actions, even kinetic ones, be taken against a state which has not
engaged in cyber operations, but which has "sponsored" them? In other
91. North Atlantic Treaty, art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243,
246.
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words, when is an armed attack attributable to a state such that the state
may be treated as if it had itself launched the attack?
Until the transnational attacks of September 11, 2001, the generally
accepted standard was set forth in the Nicaragua case. There the ICJ stated
that
an armed attack must be understood as including not merely ac-
tion by regular forces across an international border, but also
"the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups,
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force
against another State of such gravity as to amount to" (inter alia)
an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, "or its sub-
stantial involvement therein."9 2
The court noted that the activities involved should be of a "scale and
effects" that would equate to an armed attack if carried out by the state's
military. Thus, "acts by armed bands where such attacks occur on a signifi-
cant scale" would qualify, but "a mere frontier incident would not."9 3
By this standard, attribution requires (1) acts qualifying as an armed
attack and (2) that the state dispatched the non-state actors or was sub-
stantially involved in the operations. As noted earlier, the ICTY took a
more relaxed view of the degree of control necessary, accepting "overall
control" as sufficient.9 4 The events of 9/11 brought the issue of threshold
to light in a dramatic way. Assistance provided by the Taliban to al-Qaeda
met neither the Nicaragua nor Tadic standards, since the Taliban merely
provided sanctuary to al-Qaeda. The cyber analogy would be doing noth-
ing to put an end to the activities of cyber "terrorists" or other malicious
hackers operating from a state's territory when it is within its capability,
legal and practical, to do so.
Even though there was seemingly no legal basis for attribution to Af-
ghanistan, when the Coalition responded with armed force against both
al-Qaeda and the governing Taliban, no objection was raised. On the con-
trary, the Security Council condemned the Taliban "for allowing Afghani-
stan to be used as a base for the export of terrorism by the Al-Qaida
network and other terrorist groups and for providing safe haven to Usama
Bin laden, Al-Qaida and others associated with them."9 5 It seems that the
international community had lowered the normative bar of attribution
measurably. While the underlying operations must still amount to an
armed attack, it is arguable that today much less support is required for
attribution than envisaged in either Nicaragua or Tadic. Far from being
counter-legal, this process of reinterpretation is natural; understandings of
92. Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 195 (citation omitted).
93. Id.
94. It must be emphasized that the legal issue involved in that case was not
attribution of an armed attack, but rather the existence of an international armed
conflict.
95. S.C. Res. 1378, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1378 (Nov. 14, 2001).
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international legal norms inevitably evolve in response to new threats to
the global order. In that cyber operations resemble terrorism in many
regards, states may equally be willing to countenance attribution of a cyber
armed attack to a state which willingly provides sanctuary to non-state ac-
tors conducting them.
G. Armed Attacks by Non-State Actors
Although most cyber operations are launched by individuals such as
the anti-Estonian "hacktivists," concern is mounting about the prospect
that transnational terrorist organizations and other non-state groups will
turn to cyber operations as a means of attacking states.96 The concern is
well-founded. Al-Qaeda computers have been seized that contain hacker
tools, the membership of such groups is increasingly computer-literate,
and the technology to conduct cyber operations is readily available. In
one case, a seized al-Qaeda computer contained models of dams, a lucra-
tive cyber attack target, and the computer programs required to analyze
them.9
International lawyers have traditionally, albeit not universally, charac-
terized Article 51 and the customary law of self-defense as applicable solely
to armed attacks mounted by one state against another. Violent actions by
non-state actors fell within the criminal law paradigm. Nonetheless, the
international community treated the 9/11 attacks by al-Qaeda as armed
attacks under the law of self-defense. The Security Council adopted nu-
merous resolutions recognizing the applicability of the right of self-de-
fense.9 8 International organizations such as NATO and many individual
states took the same approach.9 9 The United States claimed the right to
act forcefully in self-defense,10 0 and no state objected to the assertion.
Lest this approach be dismissed as simply an emotive reaction to the hor-
rific attacks of 9/11, it must be noted that when Israel launched opera-
tions into Lebanon in response to Hezbollah's 2006 terrorism, the
96. See 2010 NATIONAL SECURrrY STRATEGY, supra note 6, at 27; NATO 2020,
supra note 7, at 17.
97. See CLAY WILSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32114, COMPUTER ATTACK AND
CYBER TERRORISM: VULNERABILITIES AND POLIcY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, 11-13 (2003).
98. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); S.C. Res
1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 11, 2001).
99. See, e.g., Org. of American States, Terrorist Threat to the Americas, OAS Doc.
RC.24/RES.1/01 (Sept. 21, 2001); Brendan Pearson, PM Commits to Mutual Defence,
AusTRALIAN FIN. REv., Sept. 15, 2001, at 9; Press Release, NATO, Statement by the
North Atlantic Council (Sept. 12, 2001), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/
pr/2001/p01-124e.htm.
100. "In response to these attacks, and in accordance with the inherent right
of individual and collective self-defence, United States armed forces have initiated
actions designed to prevent and deter further attacks on the United States. These
actions include measures against Al-Qaeda terrorist training camps and military
installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan." U.S. Rep. Letter, supra note
82.
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international community again seemed to accept a country's right to de-
fend itself against armed attacks mounted by non-state actors.'o
Despite acceptance by states of the premise that non-state actors may
qualify as the originators of an armed attack, the ICJ seems to have taken a
step backwards in two post-9/11 cases. In the advisory opinion on the Le-
gal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Tern-
tory102 and the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 03case, the ICJ
refrained from considering claims of self-defense against actions by non-
state actors, noting that no assertion had been made that the relevant ac-
tions were imputable to a state.10 4 Although the court's reasoning was
nuanced and fact-specific, it has nevertheless been widely criticized as inat-
tentive to contemporary understandings of the relevant law. In particular,
in the Wall case, three judges expressly departed from the majority's ap-
proach on the bases that it ignored the fact that Article 51 makes no men-
tion of the originator of an attack (while Article 2(4) specifically addresses
uses of force by states) and that the Security Council had deliberately
treated terrorist attacks as armed attacks in the aftermath of the 9/11.105
The court's hesitancy to embrace the notion of armed attack by non-
state actors is understandable in light of the risk of abuse. States might
well apply it to engage in robust military operations against groups in situ-
ations in which law enforcement is the more normatively appropriate re-
sponse. For instance, significant concerns have been raised regarding
counterterrorist operations occurring outside an armed conflict mounted
in states which do not consent to them. Such concerns are likely to be
even more acute in relation to cyber operations, which are conducted not
by armed members of groups resembling classic military forces, but rather
by cyber experts equipped with computers. Nevertheless, as a matter of
law, states seem comfortable with applying the concept of armed attacks to
situations involving non-state actors. Should such groups launch cyber at-
tacks meeting the threshold criteria for an armed attack, states would
likely respond within the framework of the law of self-defense.
The point that the attacks must meet the threshold criteria cannot be
overemphasized. There is no state practice supporting extension of the
concept to the actions of isolated individuals, such as hacktivists or patri-
101. See generally Michael N. Schmitt, "Change Direction" 2006: Israeli Operations
in Lebanon and the International Law of Self-Defense, 29 MICH. J. INT'L L. 127 (2008).
Many commentators and States saw the actions as violating the proportionality cri-
terion discussed above.
102. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Pal-
estinian Territory (Wall), Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9).
103. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo) (Dem. Rep.
Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, 160 (Dec. 19).
104. See Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 1.C.J. 168, 217
(Dec. 19); Wall, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 1 139 (July 9).
105. See Wall, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 6 (separate declaration of Judge Bu-
ergenthal); id. 1 33 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins); id. 1 35 (separate opin-
ion of Judge Koojmans).
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otic hackers. Further, the cyber operations must be severe enough to
qualify as armed attacks, that is, they have to result in damage to or de-
struction of property or injury to or death of individuals. Finally, as the
debate over minor border incursions demonstrates, it is uncertain whether
attacks which meet the aforementioned threshold, but are not of signifi-
cant scale, would qualify. As an example, a cyber attack that caused a sin-
gle plant's generator to overheat, thereby temporarily interrupting service
until it could be repaired, would presumably not, by the more restrictive
standard, qualify as an armed attack. Rather, it would be the cyber
equivalent of a border incursion.
H. Cross-Border Operations
When armed attacks by non-state actors emanate from outside a state,
may that state take defensive actions against its perpetrators in the terri-
tory of the state where they are based? This question has been raised re-
cently in the context of unmanned aerial vehicle strikes against terrorists
in Pakistan and elsewhere. It is no less pertinent to situations involving
cyber armed attacks launched by non-state actors from abroad.
It is indisputable that one state may employ force in another with the
consent of the territorial state. For instance, a state may grant others the
right to enter its territory to conduct counterterrorist operations, as often
occurs in Pakistan, or a state embroiled in an internal conflict with insur-
gents may request external assistance in restoring order, as with Interna-
tional Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations in Afghanistan or
United States Forces (USF) in Iraq. A State subjected to an armed attack,
whether cyber or kinetic, could, with the acquiescence of the territorial
state, equally launch cyber defensive operations into the state from which
the attacks emanated.
The legal dilemma arises when operations are conducted without ter-
ritorial state approval. By the principle of sovereignty (and the derivative
notion of territorial integrity), a state enjoys near absolute control over
access to its territory. In affirmation, the UN General Assembly has cited
the use of force by a state on the territory of another as an act of aggres-
sion.' 0 6 Yet, the right of states to use force in self-defense is no less foun-
dational. When terrorists or insurgents seek sanctuary in a state other
than that in which they are conducting operations, they bring the territo-
rial state's right of sovereignty into conflict with the victim-state's right of
self-defense.
Fortunately, international law does not require an either-or resolution
when norms clash. Instead, it seeks to balance them by fashioning a com-
promise which best achieves their respective underlying purposes. In this
case, such a balance would ensure that the territorial state need not suffer
unconstrained violations of its sovereignty, but nor would the victim-state
have to remain passive as non-state groups attack it with impunity from
106. See Definition of Aggression, supra note 57, art. 3(a).
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abroad. The resulting compromise is as follows. The victim-state must
first demand the territorial state fulfill its legal duty to ensure actions on
or from its territory do not harm other states and afford the territorial
state an opportunity to comply.' 0 7 If that state subsequently takes effective
steps to remove the threat, then penetration of its territory by the victim-
state, whether kinetically or by cyber means, is impermissible. But if the
territorial state fails to take appropriate and timely action, either because
it lacks the capability to conduct the operations or simply chooses not to
do so (e.g., out of sympathy for the non-state actors or because its domes-
tic laws preclude action), the victim-state may act in self-defense to put an
end to the non-state actor's attacks. It matters not whether the actions are
kinetic or cyber in nature, as long as they comply with the principles of
proportionality and necessity.
V. FAULT LINES IN THE LAW
The legal analysis set forth above should strike most readers as unsat-
isfactory. Clear fault lines in the law governing the use of force have ap-
peared because it is a body of law that predates the advent of cyber
operations. The normative scheme made sense when close congruity ex-
isted between the coercive instruments of international relations, particu-
larly military force, and their effects. To the extent one state disrupted
order in the international community, it usually did so by using force to
harm objects and persons. Resultantly, instrument-based normative short-
hand (use of force, armed attack, and armed conflict) was employed as a
means of precluding those effects (death, injury, destruction, and dam-
age) which were perceived as most disruptive of community stability, and
as most threatening to state security. Debates such as whether actions
short of military operations are uses of force or whether minor border
incursions qualify as armed attacks demonstrate that the foundational con-
cerns were actually consequence-based, for both reflect recognition that
the instrument-based approach is not perfectly calibrated.
The advent of cyber operations threw the instrument-based approach
into disarray by creating the possibility of dramatically destabilizing effects
caused by something other than kinetic actions. They weakened the natu-
ral congruency between the normative shorthand employed in the law
governing resort to force and those consequences which the law sought to
avoid as disruptive. Conceptually, the qualitative scheme, by which
prohibitions were expressed in terms of types of activities (use of the mili-
tary and other destructive instruments as distinguished from non-destruc-
tive ones), no longer sufficed to preclude those effects about which states
had become most concerned. A non-kinetic, non-destructive means of
generating effects which states cannot possibly countenance now existed;
107. On the duty to police one's own territory, see Corfu Channel (U.K. v.
Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
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the qualitative shorthand no longer tracked the quantitative concerns of
states.
The prohibition on the use of force has proven somewhat adaptable
to this new reality because it has long been understood to extend beyond
the application of kinetic force. Thus, it is reasonable to employ the crite-
ria suggested in this Article to identify situations in which non-kinetic ac-
tions will result in quantitatively unacceptable, and therefore prohibited,
consequences. The UN Charter mechanism for Security Council-based re-
sponses to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggres-
sion is likewise adaptable because by it threats to the peace include, simply
put, whatever the Council wishes.
Evidence of disquiet abounds. In a recent report by the National
Academy of Science, examples of armed attack included "cyberattacks on
the controlling information technology for a nation's infrastructure that
had a significant impact on the functioning of that infrastructure
(whether or not it caused immediate large-scale death or destruction of
property)" and "a cyberattack against the stock exchanges that occurs re-
peatedly and continuously, so that trading is disrupted for an extended
period of time (e.g., days or weeks)."10 8 As a matter of law, they would
likely qualify as uses of force, but not, by a strict interpretation of the self-
defense norm, as armed attacks (or as initiating an armed conflict). The
problem is that most states would surely treat them as such. In other
words, the National Academy report has misconstrued the law, but accu-
rately identified probable state behavior.
When state expectations as to the "rules of the game" deviate from
those that actually govern their actions, new norms can emerge. One
method by which this can occur is through new treaty law. However, it is
highly unlikely that any meaningful treaty will be negotiated to govern
cyber operations in the foreseeable future. The greatest obstacle is that
those states which are most vulnerable to cyber operations tend to be
those which are also most capable of conducting them. Such tension will
cause such states to hesitate before agreeing to prohibitions designed to
protect them which may also definitively limit their freedom of action.
This is especially so in light of the nascent nature of cyber warfare and the
lack of experience of most states in these operations. In international rela-
tions, states are often comfortable with a degree of vagueness.
Much more likely is the emergence of new understandings of the ex-
isting treaty law which are responsive to the realities of cyber operations.
While only subsequent treaty action can technically alter a treaty's terms,
state practice can inform their interpretation over time. A well-known ex-
ample involves veto action by permanent members of the Security Coun-
cil. The UN Charter provides that a binding resolution of the Council
requires the affirmative vote of all five permanent members.1 09 However,
108. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 70, at 254-55.
109. See U.N. Charter art. 27(3).
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state practice has been to treat the provision as blocking action only when
a member of the "P5" vetoes a proposed resolution. This counter-textual
interpretation is now accepted as the law. 110 The recent extension of the
notion of armed attack to actions by non-state actors similarly illustrates
normative evolution prompted by shifting state expectations.
In due course, similar evolution in how the concept of armed attack is
understood should be anticipated, as states increasingly accept the pro-
position that armed attacks must be judged qualitatively and quantitatively.
Consequences will remain the focus of concern, but they will be assessed
both in terms of their nature and as to their impact on affected states. In
this regard, the seven criteria proffered above in the use of force context
can serve as useful indicators of whether states are likely to characterize
particular cyber operations as armed attacks (or as initiating an armed
conflict), and thus suggest the probable vector of the law. However, for
the moment the existing law remains intact; it will be left to states to artic-
ulate the expectations and engage in practices that can serve to fuel the
normative process necessary to transform lexferenda into lex lata.1 11
110. See Bruno Simma, Stefan Brunner & Hans-Peter Kaul, Article 27, in I THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIoNs: A COMMENTARY 476, 493-98 (Bruno Simma ed.,
2d ed. 2002). The veto principle does not apply to votes on procedural matters.
111. The law as it should be and the law that is, respectively.
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